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THE PERVASIVENESS OF
ARBITRARINESS AND
DISCRIMINATION UNDER POSTFURMAN CAPITAL STATUTES*
WILLIAM J. BOWERS**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Fuman v. Georgia5
was not a clear statement reflecting a single perspective on the ills of
capital punishment. Rather, it was nine separate statements reflecting
the particular views and concerns of each Justice. Of the five concurring Justices, Brennan and Marshall found that, arbitrariness aside, the
death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment per se; Justice Marshall also found that it was used in a discriminatory way against blacks
and other minorities. Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White, on the
other hand, found the death penalty unconstitutional because of the arbitrariness of its administration under then existing statutes. Justice
Douglas identified discrimination against minorities, blacks, and disadvantaged persons as an aspect of the arbitrariness. Justice Stewart and
White, however, described the arbitrariness in different terms-as
"freakish," "random," and "rare," like being "struck by lightning" or
being "chosen in a lottery." These two pivotal members of the Furman
plurality thus adopted formulations of the arbitrariness as unsystematic
in nature, dissociated from specific extralegal sources, such as race or
class, that might exercise a systematic effect. The problem, according to
their diagnosis, was like that faced by a traveler following an unclear or
* Will appear in an expanded form as Chapter Ten in W. Bowers, Legal Homicide:
Death as Punishment in America, 1864-1982 (Northeastern University Press, Spring, 1984)
(forthcoming).
The author wishes to thank Glenn Pierce and Tracy Mayors for their help in the analysis
of Florida court processing data, David Baldus and Mary Brennan for permission to
reproduce and cite portions of their unpublished research, John McDevitt and Augusto
Diana for their help in the analysis of data on the Georgia appellate review process, and
Jeanne Winner and Susan Laws for their assistance in the preparation of the manuscript.
This work was supported in part by a grant from the Chicago Resource Center.
** Director of the Center for Applied Social Research, Northeastern University; Ph.D.,
Sociology, Columbia University, 1965; B.A., Washington & Lee University, 1957.
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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imprecise map; he or she must rely on intuition and guesswork and is
thus apt to make mistakes. The solution for the traveler is, obviously, a
better map.
By a similar logic, the Court blamed this arbitrariness on shortcomings in the pre-Furman capital statutes. These laws provided unclear or
insufficient guidance to those who must decide whether to impose a sentence of death. The unguided, standardless exercise of discretion in capital sentencing is subject to errors of judgment in much the same way as
is the traveler with an inadequate map. The solution was to formulate
capital statutes with (1) clear standards that would guide juries in sentencing, (2) procedures to remove these decisions from extraneous influences, and (3) provisions that would subject the decisions to oversight.
Thus, the statutes included provisions for explicit enumerated aggravating and mitigating circumstances, separate guilt and sentencing hearings, and automatic appellate review. This was the remedy approved
four years after Furman in Gregg v. Georgia,2 which upheld the capital
statutes of Florida, Georgia, and Texas with the concurrence of Justices
White and Stewart of the Furman plurality.
There is, however, another view of the arbitrariness found unacceptable in Furman. That some persons are sentenced to death and
others are not for essentially the same crime is not, according to this
interpretation, simply the result of confusion owing to insufficient guidance, insulation, and oversight in the exercise of discretion. Rather, it
exists because those who exercise such discretion are consistent and because their behavior reflects systematic, though perhaps unrecognized,
extralegal influences such as race, class, and origin.
Behind this alternative diagnosis is a perspective on capital punishment which holds that death as punishment is unique in its power to
express community sentiments of condemnation. Death, therefore, will
be imposed for those crimes that most offend community conscience, not
strictly because they are the most legally culpable, but because they violate social mores and boundaries. 3 Thus, offenses will be viewed as more
or less shocking and abhorrent depending upon who the victims and
offenders are in social, not just legal, terms. Persons disfavored or disadvantaged by class, race, or origin will be singled out disproportionately
for capital punishment, especially when their victims are members of
the dominant group in the community. Further, the death penalty's
expressive functions will be sought especially when cultural mores and
boundaries are threatened by social change, when social change is asso2 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
3 For a fuller discussion of this analysis, see W. Bowers, Legal Homicide: Death as Punishment in America, 1864-1982 (forthcoming) (see especially Chapter Five).
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ciated with rising crime rates, and when those crime rates are attributed
to socially disfavored or disadvantaged persons. Under such conditions,
community sentiments will call for capital punishment whether it is legally justified or not.
As a representative cross-section of the community, the jury embodies community sentiments. Jurors are not like travelers in an unfamiliar
territory. They have their own internalized maps of the social landscape. Jurors may have difficulty replacing their socially conditioned
views of victims and offenders with strictly legal considerations, especially for the crimes they find most shocking and abhorrent. Thus, interpretations of statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances in
the sentencing decision are apt to be colored by extralegal considerations. Such extralegal influences will not be restricted to the sentencing
process; indeed, according to this view, they will be deeply imbedded in
other discretionary decisions in the processing of potentially capital
cases.
Prosecutors, who are typically elected, 4 must be sensitive to community sentiments and reactions to crime, which they will encounter in
the media, among associates; and from the police, families of victims,
and prominent community spokesmen. In addition to the courtroom
presentation of a case, such sentiments and reactions may influence a
host of less public actions that greatly affect the likelihood of a death
sentence: whether to bring a capital charge, whether to accept a guilty
plea in return for a reduced charge or sentence, whether to offer a reduced charge or sentence to one defendant in return for testimony
against another, whether to develop evidence of statutory aggravating
circumstances, and whether to seek a death sentence given conviction.
To maintain community support and to win reelection, prosecutors are
likely to seek the death penalty when the community wants it, apart
from strictly legal considerations.
Defense attorneys in capital cases are also affected by community
sentiments. A disproportionate number of them are court-appointed,
rather than privately retained attorneys, who work with severely limited
resources for conducting investigations, hiring expert witnesses, and in
general preparing an effective capital defense. 5 Intense community hostility toward defendants can add to the difficulty of investigating the
4 See National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service, U.S. Department of
Justice, Sourcebook of Criminial Justice Statistics 100 & Table 1.51 (1979). Forty-four states
have only elected prosecutors; one state has both elected and appointed; three states have no
local prosecutors because all cases are handled by the attorney general.
5 The figures compiled by the State Public Defenders' Office in California give some
indication of which lawyers defend capital cases. There were 336 capital cases pending as of
July 1, 1983. Of these, 154 defendants were represented in court by public defenders; 182 by
private counsel, of which approximately 95% were court-appointed. Personal communication
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case, identifying rebuttal witnesses, and developing evidence of mitigation. Community sentiment may also develop into mistrust or animosity toward the lawyer who aggressively attempts to build a strong trial
record, expose police, prosecutorial, or judicial errors, and challenge the
constitutionality of capital punishment itself. For court-appointed attorneys in particular, this sort of defense can provoke impatience and
resentment from the bench, and thus jeopardize future court appointments. In other words, the system assigns to the least experienced, resourceful, and independent members of the bar these especially difficult
cases where the defendant's life is at stake and extralegal influences are
strongly felt.
Nor are judges-federal, state, or local-immune from extralegal
influences. Like prosecutors, defense attorneys, and jurors, they are the
products of the cultures and the communities from which they come. In
many places, state and local judges, like prosecutors, are elected and
thus accountable to the public. Appellate court judges usually are removed from the specific influences at work in the local community
where a crime occurs, but they are not removed from the broader historical, political, and social context that has supported the arbitrary and
discriminatory imposition of capital punishment. Indeed, most appellate court judges are only a step or two removed from the trial court
where they themselves may have imposed the death penalty.
To summarize the argument, if the death penalty exists primarily
for the extralegal functions it serves, and if the arbitrariness found unacceptable in Furman is a systematic reflection of this fact, then this arbitrariness should be evident in the decisions of participants at the various
stages throughout the processing of potentially capital cases. Statutory
reforms designed to regulate the exercise of discretion at one stage of the
process, such as those approved in Gregg, are predicated upon a diagnosis that fails to recognize the pervasive and systematic character of the
problem. To the extent that such reforms are effective at one point in
the process, they may simply shift or displace arbitrariness to other
points in the process.
This Article analyzes the decisions and actions of individuals involved at four stages in the procedural history of potentially capital
cases: the prosecutor's discretionary decision to bring charges and to go
with Michael G. Millman, Director, State Public Defenders' Office, California, September
28, 1983.
For a discussion of how restricted the resources of court-appointed attorneys are and how
they depend upon the presiding judge's authorization for payment of the costs they incur in
preparing a defense, see M. Brennan, Capital Representation in the State of Florida 75-77,
81-83 (First Working Paper of the Draft Report prepared for the Florida Justice Institute,
1982).
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to trial; the allocation and effectiveness of defense services; the decisions
to seek and to impose the death sentence upon convicted offenders; and
the proportionality review of death sentences by state appellate courts.
The analysis concludes with a closer look at the exercise of discretion in
the federal appeals process.
II.

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN CHARGING AND TRYING CASES

A beneficial effect of post-Funnan guided discretion statutes, noted
Justice White in Gregg v.Georgia, is that prosecutors will be guided in
their exercise of discretion by the same statutory aggravating and mitigating standards "as those by which a jury will decide the questions of
guilt and sentence."' 6 Our analysis posits, however, that in the hands of
prosecutors the statutory guidelines approved in Gregg may operate to
promote, rather than to curb, arbitrariness and discrimination early in
the handling of potentially capital cases. In a previous examination of
data on the grand jury indictments of persons charged with criminal
homicide in Florida, we observed that indictment disparities by race
and location within the state contribute substantially to the overall level
of arbitrariness and discrimination in the process leading to the death
sentence. 7 These data suggested further that racial considerations lead
prosecutors to "upgrade" some cases by alleging an aggravating felony
circumstance or charging the defendant with an accompanying felony,
and to "downgrade" others by ignoring evidence in police reports or
withholding a charge, depending upon the race of the offender and the
victim. 8

Using the Florida processing data, we now carry the analysis of
prosecutorial discretion a step further by examining factors that may
affect the prosecutor's ability to obtain a first degree murder indictment.
6 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 225 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
7 See Bowers & Pierce, ArbitrarinessandDiscriminationunder Post-Furman CapitalStatutes, 26
CRIME AND DELINQ. 563 (1980).

The work of Bowers and Pierce will be published as Chapter Seven of W. Bowers, supra note 3. Later references to this article will, for the sake of
brevity, be restricted to Chapter Seven of the book, but this is identical to Bowers & Pierce,
supra.
8 A further study of the upgrading and downgrading of cases in terms of an aggravating
felony circumstance is now being extended. See M. Radelet & G. Pierce, Race and
Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide Cases (Sept. 4, 1983) (paper presented at the 1983 meeting of the American Sociological Association in Detroit). With additional information on
homicide victims from the Florida Bureau of Vital Statistics, Michael Radelet has succeeded
in matching many more police reports and court records. Moreover, these data show that in
upgraded cases (those having a felony circumstance added in the court case records when the
police reports indicated no such circumstances), prosecutors were less likely to offer or accept
a plea bargain-further suggesting their determination to seek a death sentence. Similar patterns are now under investigation in South Carolina by Joseph Jacoby and Raymond Paternoster. See Jacoby & Paternoster, Sentencing Disparity andJuy Packing: Further Challenges to the
Death Penalty, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379 (1982).
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With a sample of persons charged with criminal homicide in twenty
Florida counties during 1976-77, 9 we have conducted a multiple regression analysis (see Table 1) to determine how the indictment decision was
affected by extralegal factors such as race, region, and attorney type,
and a broader group of legally relevant factors than we have previously
considered. 10

The aggravating circumstances include: (1) the presence of an accompanying felony; (2) multiple alleged offenders; (3) multiple murder
victims; (4) the fact that the murder victim was old, young, or female
(suggesting victim vulnerability); and (5) the use of a gun as the murder
weapon (suggesting intent to kill). The mitigating factors include evidence from the court record (1) that the defendant was an accomplice or
accessory to the crime, but not the triggerman or actual killer; (2) that
the crime was the result of, or precipitated by, an argument, dispute, or
quarrel; and (3) that the offender was less than eighteen years of age.
We have included in our analysis three factors that in principle
should not affect the handling of the defendant's case: (1) three variables
designating the racial character of the crime-black kills white, white
kills white, white kills black (black kills black is omitted); (2) two variables identifying the location of the crime within the state: the northern
region, including the north and panhandle of Florida, and the central
region (the circuits of the southern region are omitted); and (3) two variables indicating type of attorney: private attorneys appointed to the case
and paid for their services by the court, and attorneys employed as public defenders by the state to provide services to indigent clients (privately
retained counsel is omitted).
The interpretation of the regression coefficient is straightforward.
All variables in the analysis have been entered in binary forms, 1 ' hence
the regression coefficient for a given variable corresponds to the percentage difference in first degree murder indictments between the category
of that variable in the table and the omitted or reference category, controlling statistically for all other variables in the analysis. For example, a
coefficient of .25 for a felony-related killing corresponds to a twenty-five
point difference in the percentage receiving first degree murder indictments between cases with and cases without an accompanying felony,
controlling for the other variables entered into the regression analysis. In
cases where several mutually exclusive binary variables have been con9 For a description of the data, see Zeisel, Race Biasin the Administration ofthe Death Penalty:
The Florida Experience, 95 HARv. L. REv. 456 (1981).
10 These were restricted to variables in the Florida court processing data with missing
information on no more than 15% of the cases.
11 The characteristic or category of the variable identified in the table is scored "1" and
all other cases are given a value of "0."
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TABLE 1
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF LEGAL AND EXTRALEGAL FACTORS ON
FIRST DEGREE MURDER INDICTMENT AMONG PERSONS CHARGED

WITH CRIMINAL HOMICIDE IN FLORIDA, 1976-1977

A.

B.

Legally Relevant Factors
Felony related killing
More than one offender
More than one victim
Female victim
Victim 60 years or oldera
Victim 16 years or youngera
Gun used as murder weapon
Defendant accessory
Defendant 18 years or younger
Quarrel precipitated killing
Race
Black kills whiteb
White kills whiteb
White kills blackb

Regression
Coefficients
0.25**
0.20**
0.18
0.18**
0.04
-0.07
-0.06
-0.04
0.12
-0.04
0.19*
0.15**
-0.08

C. Region

D.

Northc
Centralc
Type of Attorney
Court appointedd
Public defenderd
Adjusted R 2
Number of Cases

-0.02
0.10*
0.17**
0.03
0.27
507

a Victims aged 17-59 is the reference category.
b Black kills black is the reference category.
C Southern region of Florida is the reference category. Regional groupings of circuits
are as follows: panhandle (1, 2, 3, 14); north (4, 5, 7, 8); central (6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 18,
19); south (11, 15, 16, 17).
d Privately retained attorneys is the reference category.
*
p < .05, 1 test.
**
p < .01,1 test.

structed, as with race, region, and attorney type, the reference category
is restricted to those cases excluded from all the component variables.
That is, they share the common reference category of the cases they
jointly exclude. Consequently, the coefficients for the three racial combinations in Table 1, for example, (.19, .15, and - .08) represent the percentage difference in first degree murder indictments between the
respective categories and the black kills black category (the jointly excluded cases). In the 1976-77 sample, data are available on all seventeen
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of these variables for 508, or sixty-six percent of the 771 cases. 12 The
regression results appear in Table 1.
The analysis shows that four legally aggravating factors play a substantial role in determining a first degree murder indictment: a felonyrelated killing has the greatest effect, followed by multiple offenders,
multiple victims, and female victims. Three of the four of these variables show effects significant beyond the .01 probability level. Contrary
to expectation, one other factor advanced as a mitigating circumstance-the offender's youthfulness-also appears to contribute to a first
degree murder indictment, though not significantly so. The remaining
legally relevant factors show slight effects, not exceeding coefficients of
.10.
Critically, the variables designating racial combinations show substantial and significant effects. That a black has killed a white is virtually as strong a predictor of a first degree indictment as any of the
legally relevant factors except felony circumstance, ie., the commission
of a separate felony in the course of the homicide.1 3 When the offender
and victim are both white, the effect is not quite as strong but even more
significant statistically. Together, these two racial variables represent a
white-victim effect on first degree indictment that is statistically significant well beyond the effect of either variable alone. A further examination of the data shows that white-victim cases tend to be more
aggravated, but the remaining strongly significant race-of-victim effect
in Table 1 indicates that race figures prominently in the first degree
indictment decision above and beyond legally relevant considerations.
The location of the crime within the state also is an important factor. The analysis shows a significantly higher level of first degree murder indictments in the central region of Florida (the southern region is
the reference category), when other legally relevant factors have been
controlled. Moreover, the disparity is even greater if we compare this
region with the rest of Florida (the southern and northern regions combined as the reference category). In other words, the chances of a first
degree murder indictment for otherwise comparable cases were significantly greater in the central region than elsewhere in Florida.
12 Michael Radelet has supplemented the information available at the time of our earlier
analysis, see W. Bowers, supra note 3, at Chapter Seven, with additional data on race of victim
and date and location of offense from the Florida vital statistics records. The 1976-1977 sample of criminal homicide arraignments used here excludes four cases used by.Radelet. See
Radelet, Racial Characteristicsand the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REv. 918
(1981).
13 Because there are relatively few black-kills-white cases among all criminal homicide
arraignments in these Florida counties, the statistical significance of this effect (a .03
probability) is less than that of some other variables showing comparable regression coefficients, but still well within the .05 standard.
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Finally, defendants with court-appointed attorneys were far more
likely to receive a first degree murder indictment compared to those
with privately retained attorneys. Analysis of the data further indicates
that court-appointed attorneys typically handle more difficult cases in
terms of legally aggravating and mitigating considerations than do public defenders or privately retained counsel. However, the highly significant regression coefficient for court-appointed attorneys in the presence
of these legally aggravating and mitigating factors strongly suggests that
such attorneys are less effective in averting a first degree murder indictment than are other types of attorneys.
Thus, the statistical evidence shows that race and location are powerful independent influences on the likelihood of a first degree murder
indictment. At this early stage in the process that leads to the death
sentence, the prosecutor exercises almost total discretion over the decision whether to indict for first degree murder. 14 The effects of race and
location remain strong not only in the presence of felony circumstances,
but also with controls for other legally relevant considerations.
How does this statistical evidence square with the experiences of
those who handle capital cases? The decisions of prosecutors to bring a
capital charge and to take such a charge to trial recently have been
examined by the Florida Justice Institute through interviews with
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys.1 5 The sample was drawn
from the same counties as the Florida court processing data presented
above. Many of the respondents had participated in the cases that constitute the data base for the analyses presented above.
The respondents reported a wide range of extralegal influences on
prosecutors' decisions to charge and try capital cases. The answers of a
state circuit court judge illustrate the point. To the question, "What
influences the decision to indict for first degree murder?" he answered:
A high publicity case is more likely to be filed first degree murder. [Also]
pressure from the police-the police will convince themselves they've got a
better case than they do, and the Assistant State Attorney assigned to
charge the case may
not be strong enough to stand up to a particular po16
lice investigator.
In response to the question, "What influences the decision to take the
case to trial on a first degree murder charge?" he answered:
Facts of the case plus how well the attorneys know each other and how
closely they worked together. You pay more attention to a good attorney
14 See LaFave, Prosecutors'Discretion in the UnitedStates, 18 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 532 (1970).
For a more specific discussion of the extent of prosecutorial discretion in capital cases, see
Boris, Sterolypes andDispositionsfor CriminalHomicides , 17 CRIMINOLOGY 139 (1979); see also W.
Bowers, supra note 3, at Chapter Seven.
15 M. Brennan, supra note 5.
16 Letter from Mary Brennan to author (Spring, 1983).
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TABLE 2
FACTORS AFFECTING THE DECISION TO BRING A CAPITAL CHARGE
AND TO TAKE SUCH A CHARGE TO TRIAL ACCORDING TO FLORIDA
JUDGES, PROSECUTORS AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS
Number of
Responses
A.

Legal Factors or Considerations

Al.

Facts of the case, fact pattern, facts (e.g., do facts fit the
definition of Murder 1)
Aggravating or mitigating considerations (presence,
number, relative weight)
Particular aggravating circumstance (prior record,
accompanying felony, premeditation, heinous or executiontype killing)
Overall strength of case/probability of conviction
Evidence, quality of evidence/witness credibility, reliability

A2.
A3.

A4.
A5.
B.

Personal Orientations or Values of Prosecutors

Bl.

Aggressiveness, competitiveness, ambition (e.g., personal
pride, win-loss record, notch-in-the-gun syndrome, desire to
be re-elected)
Orientation toward punishment (deterrence, retribution,
appropriateness)
Attitude toward particular defendant or victim
(prominence, character, class, race)

B2.
B3.
C.

Situational Pressures or Constraints in Handling Cases

Cl.

Plea bargaining strategy, opposing counsel (e.g., indict high
to force plea, plead 2' for accomplice testimony, experience
of defense counsel)
Time, caseload, office policies, judge's reputation
Influence of victim's family (e.g., victim's family wants
death, can't reduce charge)

C2.
C3.
C4.

Pressure from police (e.g., police press for Murder 1)

D.

Social InflUences or Pressures from Community

Dl.

Media coverage, publicity, notoriety (including effects on
political climate, plea bargaining, re-election)
Public opinion, reaction (community conscience,
confidence, outrage, anger)
Political/racial climate (politics, political realities, race,
racism)

D2.
D3.

75

Percent
of Total
39.9

20

10.6

16

8.5

30

15.9

44

23.5

39

20.7
17
17
5

than one you know is a lightweight, when he communicates with you
about the case ....
[Also] pressure from the top, the supervisor of the Assistant State Attorney assigned to try the case. Even if the Assistant State Attorney assigned to try the case knows he can't win it, he may go to trial anyway
because a directed verdict by the judge [a ruling that first degree murder is
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not proved as a matter of law so the jury is not allowed to convict for first
degree murder regardless of the original charge] looks better publicity-wise
record than the office dropping [dismissing
on the elected State Attorney's
17
or reducing] the case.

Pressure from the police, the division of responsibility in the prosecutor's office, the prosecutor's relationship with the defense attorney,
and the political advantage of seeking a death sentence even when the
facts of the case do not warrant it are only a few of the extralegal considerations described by respondents. A more comprehensive picture
emerges from the answers of all respondents. The two questions about
filing a capital charge and taking such a charge to trial yielded some 188
codable responses18 from sixteen judges, sixteen prosecutors, and thirtyeight defense attorneys. 19 These responses have been grouped into
fifteen categories under four general headings in Table 2.
Respondents mentioned more extralegal considerations-including
the personal orientation of the prosecutor, situational pressures and constraints in handling a case, and social influences and pressures from the
community-than factors falling within the general category labelled
"legal factors or considerations." The personal characteristics of prosecutors most frequently mentioned were aggressiveness, competitiveness,
and ambition (B 1). The only legal consideration that is cited more often
than these personal attributes is the "facts of the case" (Al). Among
situational pressures and constraints, the most frequently cited were
those referring to plea bargaining (Cl). This category includes statements such as "indict high to force a plea," and "plead to second degree
murder for accomplice testimony." Two themes were prominently mentioned under "social influences or pressures from the community:" media coverage, publicity, and notoriety (Dl), and public opinion and
reactions (D2). Only two other specific categories (Al, the facts of the
case, and Cl, plea bargaining) were more frequently mentioned.
Thus, the influence of extralegal considerations on-the decision to
bring a capital charge and to take it to trial is broadly recognized by
those who prosecute, defend, and judge such cases. One could quarrel
with the placement of certain categories of response in the general
groupings in Table 2. For instance, pressures from the victim's family
(C3) or from the police (C4) might be regarded as social rather than
situational factors; the use of a single aggravating factor to the exclusion
17 Id.

18 Answers were recorded, written down verbatim, and classified into 15 categories. Most
respondents provided a single answer to each question, but some gave more extensive, multiple responses.
19 Responses to these two questions were forwarded to us by Mary Brennan for tabulation
and do not appear in the Florida Justice Institute's Report, which deals chiefly with defense
services.
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of others (A3) might be considered a personal predisposition of the prosecutor rather than a strictly legal consideration. But these objections do
not alter the fundamental picture of a decision-making process which
responds to social influences from the community, situational pressures
in handling cases, and personal orientations of prosecutors, as well as
legal considerations.
III.

ALLOCATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF DEFENSE SERVICES

It is generally said that a good lawyer can greatly affect the outcome of a case. The unavoidable implication is that those who can afford to retain a good lawyer will have a distinct advantage in the legal
process. Does it work the other way as well? Are impoverished or indigent defendants who must rely upon public defenders or court-appointed attorneys at a distinct disadvantage in the legal process? The
type of attorney is not a legally relevant consideration that should influence the outcome of any case, certainly not that of a capital case.
We have seen in Table 1 that defendants with court-appointed attorneys are more likely to be indicted for first degree murder than those
with public defenders or privately retained counsel, and that this is not
simply because the most difficult cases end up in the hands of courtappointed attorneys. Indeed, in equally death-prone cases, 20 court-appointed attorneys are evidently less effective than other types of attorneys in maneuvering to avert a first degree murder indictment. For
whatever reasons, court-appointed attorneys appear to provide less effective defense services at this early stage in the process. Is this disadvantage to their clients cumulative? Does the defendant with a courtappointed attorney lose ground at each successive stage of the process?
To learn more about how attorney type affects the defendant's
overall chances of receiving a death sentence, we examined the separate
and joint effects of attorney type, race, region, and legally relevant factors on the likelihood of a first degree murder conviction from the sample of those indicted for first degree murder in Florida from 1973
through 1977.21 The independent variables and the analytic procedures
are the same as those used in Table 1 to examine the factors influencing
indictment. The difference is that we are now considering only those
defendants who moved a step closer to a death sentence. The data on
all variables was available for 613, or fifty-nine percent, of the 1045
20 Death-prone cases are cases that, by our analysis, are equally likely to lead to a first
degree murder indictment.
21 Linda Foley and Richard Powell have reported differences in the likelihood of death
sentence by attorney type, but without controlling for other factors associated with the imposition of a death sentence. See Foley & Powell, The Discretionof Prosecutors,Judges andJuries in
Capital Cases, 7 CRIM. JUST. REv. 16 (1982).

ARBITRARINESS & DISCRIMINATION

1983]

1079

TABLE 3
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF LEGAL AND EXTRALEGAL FACTORS ON
FIRST DEGREE MURDER CONVICTION AMONG PERSONS INDICTED
FOR FIRST DEGREE MURDER IN FLORIDA,

1973-1977
Regression

A.

Legally Relevant Factors
Felony related killing
More than one offender
More than one victim
Female victim
Victim 60 years or oldera
Victim 16 years or youngera
Gun used as murder weapon
Defendant accessory
Defendant 18 years or younger
Quarrel precipitated killing

B.

b

0.29**
0.18**
-0.07

Region
c

0.07
0.13**

North
Centralc
D.

0.15**
0.10*
0.11
0.13**
-0.06
0.09
-0.03
-0.29**
-0.16"*
0.02

Race
Black kills white
White kills whiteb
b
White kills black

C.

Coefficients

Type of Attorney
Court appointedd
Public defenderd
Adjusted R

2

Number of Cases

0.06
0.00
0.14
612

a Victims aged 17-59 is the reference category.
b Black kills black is the reference category.
c Southern region of Florida is the reference category as defined in Table 1, note c.
d
Privately retained attorneys is the reference category.
*
p < .05, 1 test.
** p < .01, t test.
22
cases in the combined sample of 1973-1977 criminal homicide cases.
The results of the regression analysis appear in Table 3.

22 The cases in this sample were collected at two different times by Dr. Linda Foley of
North Florida University and Professor Hans Zeisel of the University of Chicago. Information was gathered on all first degree murder indictments from 1973 through 1976 in twentyone Florida counties. This accounted for approximately 75% of Florida's death sentences
over that period. To obtain a broader range of homicide cases, including all homicide
charges at arraignment, data later were gathered for the period 1976 through 1977 in a sample of twenty Florida counties, including some but not all of the counties sampled in the first
phase of the data collection.
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Again, as with first degree murder indictment, the variables of felony circumstance, number of offenders, and female victim are statistically significant predictors, and number of victims is comparable in
magnitude but not significant among the legally aggravating factors.
There are, however, two distinct differences between Tables 1 and 3 in
the presumably mitigating factors. First, the youthfulness of the defendant has become a significant mitigating factor in the process leading to
conviction, as compared to its apparently aggravating role at indictment. Second, the fact that a defendant was an accessory rather than
the triggerman significantly reduces the likelihood of a first degree murder conviction. The corresponding reduction in the coefficient for multiple offenders from Tables 1 to 3 suggests that prosecutors typically will
indict all offenders for first degree murder in multiple-offender cases in
order to bargain for testimony that will convict the alleged triggerman.
Again, the age of the victim, a quarrel as a precipitating factor, and the
use of a gun as the murder weapon show little effect in the presence of
the other predictors.
Race and region remain statistically powerful determinants independent of legally relevant considerations. Black defendant-white
victim has as strong an effect as any other variable in the analysis. In
fact, the effect on a black offender of having killed a white rather than a
black person (the reference category) is equivalent to the effect on any
offender of committing the murder rather than being the accessory to
the crime. White defendant-white victim is the third strongest predictor
of a first degree murder conviction; thus, the race of the defendant given
a white victim has a nearly significant effect (p =.067) on the likelihood
of a first degree murder conviction, controlling for legally relevant factors.2 3

Racial bias is stronger in the conviction process than it is in the

indictment (as shown in Table 1).
Region has a statistically significant impact on the conviction stage
of the process as well, and again it is the central region of Florida where
first degree murder convictions are most likely compared with otherwise
comparable cases in the rest of the state. The northern region also shows
a greater likelihood of first degree murder conviction than the southern
region (as the reference category) but the difference does not reach statistical significance. Thus, there are substantial regional disparities in
the likelihood that a person indicted for first degree murder will actually
be convicted on that charge, and this pattern is compounded when we
consider the indictment and conviction stages together.
23 To estimate this effect we have omitted the white kills white category and included

black kills black in the regression equation. Black kills white shows a regression coefficient of
.11 (equal to the difference between .29 and .18 above in Table 1) with a probability of

p.=06 7 .
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Attorney type appears to have less effect on conviction than it did
on indictment, and less effect on conviction than race, region, or legally
relevant factors. In otherwise comparable cases, court-appointed attorneys are less likely to avert a first degree murder conviction than either
public defenders or privately retained counsel, a finding consistent with
the pattern at indictment, though the effect shown in Table 3 is not
statistically significant. That attorney type appears to have less effect on
conviction is contrary to our expectation. One reason the difference at
conviction is not greater may be that privately retained counsel and
public defenders are more effective than court-appointed attorneys in
negotiating an agreement that the prosecutor not ask for a death penalty in exchange for the defendant pleading guilty to first degree murder. The data to be presented in Table 4 bear further upon this
possibility.
That type of attorney will affect the outcome of capital cases is a
fact accepted by most of those members of the bar interviewed in the
Florida Justice Institute study.24 The study concentrated chiefly on the
provision of defense services, rather than the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in capital cases. The interviews with judges, prosecutors, and
defense attorneys dealt with the selection and appointment of defense
counsel in such cases, the remuneration available to them, their motives
and justifications for taking such cases, the training and experience they
bring to these cases, and the conditions of independence or interference
under which they work. Their responses help to explain the relatively
poor performance of court-appointed attorneys revealed in the statistical
analysis.
In response to questions about the impact of limited resources, espe25
cially the $3,500 maximum fee cap for defense services in capital cases,
respondents made the following observations:
The court won't give you anywhere near the kind of money you need to try
a capital case-the defendant is supposed to be on the same footing [as one
who can afford an attorney] and in no way is he-you can't26prepare any
case for $2-3,000 and that's about what you're going to get.
You're doing a disservice to your other clients if you take the appointment
and get $3,500 and your paying clients suffer. . . . [t]he cap deters competent attorneys and leaves the judges a smaller pool of good attorneys to
24 M. Brennan, Capital Representation in the State of Florida 16-18 (Draft Report prepared for the Florida Justice Institute, 1982).
25 M. Brennan, supra note 5, at 75. At the time the survey was conducted, FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 925.036 (West Supp. 1983) provided that no matter how many charges or counts were
involved, the maximum fee paid an attorney appointed according to FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 925.035 (West 1973 & West Supp. 1983) to defend a capital case was $3,500.
26 M. Brennan, Capital Representation in the State of Florida 83 (Second Working Paper
prepared for the Florida Justice Institute, 1982).
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appoint from2 7 . . . [and] doesn't provide much incentive to do the job
competently.
Dollar-wise [appointed attorneys] peak out before going to trial, meaning
the trial is his gift to the defendant-it's free-that's his practice he's cutting into. His bills continue to pile up, his clierts call and ask, "Where is
he?" The cap makes hungry, inexperienced guy take cases, but attorneys
28
who can command fees can't afford to.
Several attorneys described the approach of court-appointed attorneys to such cases:
[W]here a judge appoints an attorney [that attorney's] natural reaction is
not to give the judge too hard a time.
If the defendant has to have an attorney appointed for him, he is lower
class and nobody cares if you lose the case.
[A]n appointed attorney is more likely to plead a defendant guilty-even
to first degree murder. They're happy, they got their fee and if they don't
negotiate the judge gets pissed.
It's insane to ruin your practice with a case like that unless to curry favor
29
with the judge [by taking the case despite the dollar cap].
Some members of the bar explained that the way appointments are
made tends to load the dice against some categories of defendants. According to one judge, "[I don't] go down the list and automatically appoint the next name but [try] to use discretion and appoint a qualified
attorney, but not the 'best."' 30 Another said that a judge in the city
where he practices is believed to be "matching up incompetent attor'3 1
neys with heinous defendants.
Respondents also reported a lack of independence, if not interference, from the bench. One attorney commented,
There's a problem where the judge holds the purse strings; judges make it
clear to the appointed attorney [that his] fee will be diminished and/or he
won't be appointed again, according to what he does outside of what they
32
expect of him (ie., to plead guilty, not make motions, etc.).
Those who take such appointments are generously characterized by
their colleagues as "new inexperienced attorneys" or more disparagingly
as attorneys who "appear to be competent in the sense that they are not
33
disbarred."
The Florida Justice Institute's analysis of these interviews presents a
detailed picture of a system that assigns the most death-prone defend27 M. Brennan, supra note 5, at 86.
28 Id. at 75.
29 Id. at 73, 76.
30
31
32
33

Id. at 65 (corrected by Mary Brennan from verbatim transcript of interview).
M. Brennan, supra note 24, at 42, 71.
M. Brennan, supra note 5, at 76.
M. Brennan, supra note 26, at 66, 75.
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ants to the least experienced attorneys, who lack the resources, incentives, and even the independence to provide the kind of defense their
clients especially require. Moreover, even if the perceptions of these respondents are not accurate in all instances, they nevertheless constitute a
"social reality" that is bound to have a demoralizing effect upon the
way court-appointed attorneys approach their work. 34 Thus, the statistical data on court processing of homicide cases in Florida and the interview data from the Florida Justice Institute's study tell the same story in
different but complementary ways.
IV.

THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION IN THE SENTENCING STAGE OF
THE PROCESS

Sentencing decisions were the chief locus of the arbitrariness in capital punishment according to the Supreme Court's diagnosis. As a solution, the Supreme Court, in Gregg v. Georgia 3 5 approved sentencing
reforms that were supposed to insulate and guide the exercise of sentencing discretion and also were believed to eliminate arbitrariness that
might otherwise enter at earlier stages in the process. As we have seen,
however, the Court was wrong about the presumed derivative benefits
of these sentencing reforms; arbitrariness by race and location are
strongly evident at indictment and conviction. What about the primary
target of post-Funnan statutory reforms? Has this solution at least succeeded in purging arbitrariness from the sentencing process?
To carry our analysis of the sentencing decision a step further with
the Florida processing data, we have performed a multiple regression
analysis using the same legal and extralegal factors examined in Tables
2 and 3. The analysis is based on 191 cases with complete information,
or sixty-three percent of the 305 first degree murder convictions in the
1973-1977 combined sample. The results of this analysis appear in Table 4.

34 For a summary discussion of the differences between various types of attorneys and
what that social reality is like, see M. Brennan, supra note 5, at 90-92.
35 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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TABLE 4
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF LEGAL AND EXTRALEGAL FACTORS ON
DEATH SENTENCES AMONG PERSONS CONVICTED OF FIRST DEGREE

MURDER IN FLORIDA, 1973-1977

A.

Legally Relevant Factors
Felony related killing
More than one offender
More than one victim
Female victim
Victim 60 years or oldera
Victim 16 years or youngera
Gun used as murder weapon
Defendant accessory
Defendant 18 years or younger
Quarrel precipitated killing

B.

0.13
0.13
-0.17

Region
Northc
Centralc

D.

0.23**
0.11
0.10
-0.00
0.03
0.20
0.02
-0.12
-0.14
-0.06

Race
Black kills whiteb
White kills whiteb
White kills blackb

C.

Regression
Coefficients,

0.22**
0.09

Type of Attorney
Court appointedd
Public defender d

0.22**
0.16*

2
Adjusted R

Number of Cases

191

Victims aged 17-59 is the reference category.
Black kills black is the reference category.
c Southern region of Florida is the reference category as defined in Table 1, note c.
d Privately retained attorneys is the reference category.
*
p < .05, t test.
p < .01, 1 test.
a

b
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Among the legally aggravating factors, felony circumstance, and, to
a lesser, nonsignificant extent, both multiple offenders and multiple victims appear to contribute to the imposition of a death sentence. In
contrast to the indictment and the conviction stages, however, a female
victim has no effect, but a youthful victim has a sizeable, though nonsignificant, 36 effect on sentencing. All three mitigating factors apparently impede the imposition of a death sentence. Because this sample of
first degree murder convictions is much smaller than the samples in Tables 1 and 3, estimated effects of a given size are less likely to achieve
statistical significance. Thus, of six legally relevant variables with coefficients of. 10 or greater, only felony circumstance has an effect that is
statistically significant.
Among the variables reflecting offender-victim racial combinations,
there is evidence of a white-victim effect at the sentencing stage. Both
black kills white and white kills white cases are more likely to receive a
death sentence than the black kills black reference category, and far
more likely than the relatively few white kills black cases. When the
white-victim cases are combined and examined with black-victim cases
as the reference category, the effect of having a white victim (b = .13)
approaches statistical significance (p = . 11).3 7 Thus, racial considerations appear to affect each successive stage of the process and have a
consistent cumulative effect over the entire process, apart from a
number of legally aggravating and mitigating factors.
Regional disparities in sentencing are even greater than they were
at other stages of the process. Courts in the northern region are far
more likely to impose a death sentence on convicted first degree murderers than those elsewhere in the state. The difference between the northern and the southern regions (as the reference category) is highly
significant and virtually as great as any other effect in Table 4. The
likelihood of a death sentence is also greater in the central than in the
southern region, though not significantly so, given the size of the sample.
Since the central region is also more likely to indict and convict on capital charges, the cumulative effect of the process in the central region
may nevertheless rival the death sentence proneness of the northern region at the sentencing stage. At each stage of the process, the southern
region is clearly less likely than the rest of the state to move otherwise
36 Because of the relatively small number of youthful offenders convicted of first degree
murder in this sample, the regression coefficient that would be significant in a larger sample
does not reach statistical significance here.
37 It should be noted at this point that the use of the felony circumstance variable drawn
from the court case records may spuriously reduce our estimates of racial effects because of
the apparent "upgrading" of white-victim cases to include allegations of a felony circumstance in the court case records where none appeared in the police reports. See W. Bowers,
supra note 3, at 245, Table 7-9. The true effect of victim's race may, therefore, be even
stronger than shown in Tables 1, 3, and 4.
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comparable cases toward a death sentence. These regional disparities
are statistically significant at each stage of the process and their cumulative effect over the entire process is far beyond chance statistical
variation.
Finally, type of attorney is among the strongest factors affecting the
sentences received by convicted first degree murderers. Being defended
by a court-appointed attorney is on a par with having committed a felony-related murder as a predictor that a convicted defendant will be
sentenced to death. Having a public defender as counsel is also significantly associated with receiving a death sentence. The disadvantage of
being defended by court-appointed attorneys in the sentencing process
may reflect, in part, their ineffectiveness at the earlier stage in trading a
first degree murder guilty plea for the prosecutor's promise not to seek
the death penalty. This would mean that more of the court-appointed
attorney's cases that resulted in a first degree murder conviction were
subjected to a penalty trial. In any case, over the entire process from
indictment through sentencing, having a court appointed attorney is almost as great a disadvantage in the defendant's effort to avoid the death
penalty as having killed a white rather than a black person.
Our findings in Florida were replicated recently by a study conducted in Georgia. There, still stronger evidence of racial and regional
disparities in sentencing were compiled in the preliminary report of
David Baldus, George Woodworth, and Charles Pulaski. 38 Baldus,
Woodworth, and Pulaski collected. extensive data on more than 600
cases in which the defendants were found guilty by a jury or pleaded
guilty to first degree murder charges between 1973 and 1978. They obtained data on over 250 potentially aggravating or mitigating factors for
each case from official records of the Georgia Supreme Court, the Georgia Department of Offender Rehabilitation, the Georgia Department of
Probations and Paroles, and Georgia's Bureau of Vital Statistics; data
were also obtained from questionnaires sent to defense counsel and prosecutors. With these data, Baldus and his associates examined race-ofvictim disparities in sentencing for cases that were: (1) eligible for a
death sentence on each of Georgia's ten statutory aggravating circumstances; (2) matched in terms of the number of statutory aggravating
circumstances present; (3) equated on an index constructed to reflect
both aggravating and mitigating factors most predictive of sentencing
outcomes; (4) similar in terms of specific aggravating and mitigating fac38 D. Baldus, G. Woodworth & C. Pulaski, The Impact of Procedural Reform on Exces-

siveness, Differential Treatment Along Racial Lines and Arbitrariness in Death Sentencing:
The Georgia Experience Before and After Furman v. Georgia (1982) (Draft Report to the
National Institute of Justice, Center for Interdisciplinary Studies, College of Law, Syracuse
University).
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TABLE 5
LIKELIHOOD OF A PENALTY TRIAL BY RACE OF VICTIM AT VARIOUS
LEVELS OF AGGRAVATION/MITIGATION AMONG CONVICTED FIRST
DEGREE MURDERERS IN GEORGIA: 1973-1978a

Level of
aggravation/mitigation
1 (low)
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 (high)

White Victim Cases

Black Victim Cases

.05

.0

(41)

(70)

.08
(52)
.15

.07
(54)
.06

(60)

(53)

.30

.22

(50)

(23)

.71
(41)
.88
(50)
.91
(34)
1.0

.35
(26)
.64
(11)
.87
(7)
1.0

(32)

(3)

a Drawn from Baldus, Woodworth & Pulaski, supra note 38, at n.98, Part II.

tors identified as most important in regression analyses; and (5) alike in
"salient features" as determined on an ad hoc basis from a close reading
of the cases.3 9 In each of these analyses, they found substantial and consistent sentencing differences by race of victim in otherwise comparable
cases. They found, moreover, that these disparities were due more to
prosecutorial decisions to seek the death sentence than to jury decisions
to impose the death sentence.
The role of prosecutorial discretion in the sentencing process is
presented in Table 5. As to white victim and black victim murders for
which there were jury convictions, the Table shows the likelihood of a
sentencing trial at corresponding levels on an index constructed to reflect the most predictive aggravating and mitigating factors on the holding of a penalty trial. This is the third and the most conservative of their
analytic approaches presented.40 The regression-based index of aggravating and mitigating factors was constructed specifically to provide a
conservative test of hypothesized racial disparities by excluding race of
39 Id.

at 17-27.

40 Id at 25.
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TABLE 6
LIKELIHOOD OF A DEATH SENTENCE BY REGION AT VARIOUS
LEVELS OF AGGRAVATION/MITIGATION AMONG CONVICTED FIRST
DEGREE MURDERERS IN GEORGIA: 1973-1978a

Levels of
aggravation/mitigation
1 (low)

2
3
4
5
6
7
8 (high)

North

North
Central

.0

.0

(1)
.0
(11)
.0
(14)
.0
(9)
.0
(9)
.0
(2)
.0
(6)
.40
(10)

(5)
.0
(12)
.0
(34)
.0
(21)
.14
(28)
.05
(21)
.61
(18)
.75
(51)

Fulton
County

Southeast

Southwest

-

-

-

.0
(7)
.0
(24)
.0
(20)
.06
(17)
.10
(10)
.17
(6)
.38
(16)

.0
(14)
.0
(45)
.07
(14)
.0
(11)
.14
(7)
.07
(14)
.77
(26)

.0
(14)
.0
(25)
.0
(26)
.17
(12)
.11
(9)
.10
(10)
.68
(28)

a Drawn from Baldus, Woodworth & Pulaski, supra note 38, at Table 25.

victim as a regressor. Thus, some of the effects of victim's race are incorporated into the index by the presence of correlated factors such as victim's social class.
According to Table 5, Georgia prosecutors decide to hold penalty
trials disproportionately in white victim cases as opposed to black victim
cases at most levels of aggravation/mitigation. There are consistent and
sometimes striking disparities of treatment by race of victim, notwithstanding the conservative bias of this regression-based aggravation/mitigation index. As a consequence, sentencing juries see mostly
white victim cases at relatively high levels of aggravation. Race-of-victim comparisons of jury decisions to impose death sentences are thus
limited by the small number of black victim cases at a given aggravation/mitigation level. The differences that do appear, however, tend to
compound further the disparities at intermediate levels of
aggravation/mitigation.
Baldus and his associates also examined specific sentencing disparities for convicted first degree murderers in five regional groupings of
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judicial circuits in Georgia. 4' Their analysis reveals extreme sentencing
disparities by region, especially as aggravation level increases, as shown
in Table 6. Thus, among the most aggravated cases, no more than forty
percent of the convicted murderers receive a death sentence in the
northern region and Fulton County, compared to at least two-thirds of
their counterparts in the other three regions. The investigators show,
moreover, that these extreme disparities persist when the comparisons
are restricted to white victim cases. 42 These regional disparities are underscored by the fact that just twenty-six, or fifteen percent, of Georgia's
159 counties were responsible for eighty-five percent of the death
43
sentences imposed between 1973 and 1978 in that state.
In continuing research, Baldus and his associates have gathered additional data on the process of Georgia homicide cases from indictment
through sentencing, extending the period of coverage through 1979. Although the analyses of these data are still preliminary, Baldus summarized the cumulative findings of this research in an affidavit of June 22,
1982, prepared for the petitioner in Smith v. Balkcom:44
Differential treatment of white and black victim cases appears to prevail
at each stage of the capital charging and sentencing process beyond initial
indictment-specifically in plea bargaining decisions, jury guilt decisions,
to proceed to a penalty trial, and the jury's decithe prosecutor's decision
45
sion at sentencing.
With the evidence of race- and region-linked sentencing differentials in Florida 46 and with stronger, more rigorously controlled evidence
of this sort now becoming available on Georgia, 4 7 it is obvious that despite statutory sentencing guidelines and separate sentencing hearings,
the sentencing stage of the process is still subject to the extralegal influence of race and place. Thus, of the three reforms approved in Greggstatutory sentencing guidelines, separate sentencing hearings, and automatic appellate review-the last of these must-bear a heavy burden if
the post-Furman capital statutes are to meet the Furman standard.
41 Id at 104-11.
42 Id. at 110 Table 26.
43 Id. at 106 n.107,
44 Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 181 (1982).
45 D. Baldus, G. Woodworth & C.'Pulaski, The Differential Treatment of White and

Black Victim Homicide Cases in Georgia's Capital Charging and Sentencing Process: Preliminary Findings 29, app. D to Petitioner's, cert. petition in Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573
(5th Cir. 1981),petitionfor cert.filed, 50 U.S.L.W. - (U.S. June 22, 1982) (No. 81-6978), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 181 (1982).
46 See supra Table 4; see also W. Bowers, supra note 3, at Chapter Seven.
47 See Table 5 and Table 6.
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STATE APPELLATE REVIEW

The United States Supreme Court declared in Gregg that automatic
appellate review of all death sentences "serves as a check against the
random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. '4 In this context,
Justice White commented that Georgia's statutory provision for "proportionality review" requires the Georgia Supreme Court to "do much
more than determine whether the penalty was lawfully imposed. '49 He
noted that "[i]t must go on to decide-after reviewing the penalties imposed in 'similar cases'-whether the penalty is 'excessive or disproportionate' considering both the crime and the defendant." 50
State appellate courts however, may, be ill-prepared and perhaps
disinclined to perform the oversight and monitoring functions assigned
to them under the new capital statutes. They generally do not compare
the sentence in one case with those in others, nor do they directly collect
and evaluate evidence; instead, arguments are reviewed on the basis of
evidence that has been admitted in other courts. Evidence that the appellate review process is not living up to the Supreme Court's expectations is mounting. We have demonstrated elsewhere 5 ' that racial and
locational disparities in the imposition of death sentences are not being
reduced by the actions of the state supreme courts of Florida and
Georgia.
Baldus, Pulaski, and Woodworth recently completed a more detailed study of Georgia's appellate review process. 5 2 For its proportionality review, the Georgia Supreme Court is required by statute to
identify cases "similar" in characteristics of the crime and the defendant
to the one under review, and then to compare the sentence under review
with those imposed in these similar cases. The pool from which the
court may select "similar" cases should, according to the Georgia statute, include capital cases in which sentences were imposed after January
1, 1970. The statute also requires that the cases selected as similar be
cited in an appendix to each of the court's published opinions upholding
53
a death sentence.
Baldus and his associates examined the court's selection of similar
cases for its proportionaltiy reviews of sixty-eight affirmed post-Funman
death sentences for murder. Using the detailed data collected on some
48 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976).
49 Id.

at 223.

50 Id.

51 See W. Bowers, supra note 3, at 36, Tables 7-14 and 7-15 and accompanying text.
52 D. Baldus, G. Woodworth & C. Pulaski, Proportionality Review of Death Sentences:
An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience (1982) (Draft report to the National Institute
of Justice, Center for Interdisciplinary Studies, College of Law, Syracuse University).
53 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-10-35, -37 (1981).
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750 capital cases (approximately 150 pre-Furman and 600 post-Funnan)
during the period 1970-1978, Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski compared the cases cited as similar by the court with cases identified as (1)
comparable in terms of aggravation/mitigation index scores; (2)
matched on the basis of specific facts or main determinants analysis; and
(3) alike in the salient features of the case. 54 They found that the cases
cited as similar by the Georgia Supreme Court were more highly aggravated and more likely to have received a death sentence than those identified as similar by any of the three empirically based and objectively
specified methods the researchers employed.
The author is currently conducting an analysis of the Georgia review process using a somewhat different approach.5 5 Instead of identifying similar cases by objective standards and then comparing them with
those cited by the court as similar, our approach has been to identify the
factors that distinguish the cases chosen as similar from those eligible
cases the court did not select. That is, we have attempted to discover
the criteria the Georgia Supreme Court actually applies, knowingly or
56
otherwise, in the selection of similar cases.
We are using the Georgia Supreme Court's own data, collected specifically for purposes of proportionality review as directed by Georgia's
capital statute, on all capital cases resulting in life or death sentences
that were appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court after January, 1970.
The data come from a six-page questionnaire completed by trial judges
in cases where a death sentence was imposed under the post-Furmkn statute, and by a clerk of the court for all cases where the sentence was life
as well as for the pre-Funnan cases where the sentence was death. The
questionnaires provide data on the crime, the defendant, the trial process, and the outcome or disposition of the case including jury findings
and sentence imposed. The data for some 297 murder cases tried between 1970 and 1977 (including the first thirty-six post-Furman death
sentences for murder reviewed for proportionality) were obtained pursuant to a motion for discovery filed by Atlanta attorney Millard
54 These correspond to procedures (3) through (5) as enumerated in the text accompanying note 39, supra, and they are described in detail in D. Baldus, G. Woodworth & C. Pulaski,
supra note 38.
55 W. Bowers, J. McDevitt & A. Diana, Proportionality Review by the Georgia Supreme
Court: Evaluation or Rationalization? (1983) (unpublished manuscript, Center for Applied
Social Research, Northeastern University).
56 This approach avoids the difficulty of making a priori assumptions about the standards
of comparability the Georgia Supreme Court should have used in specific cases. A federal
district court judge raised this objection in evidentiary hearings for House v. Balkcom, 562 F.
Supp. 1111 (N.D. Ga. 1983), and McCorquodale v. Balkcom, 525 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Ga.
1981), to our earlier analysis of these data in which we generated groups of similar cases in
terms of the number of persons killed, the presence of accompanying felony circumstances, a
prior record of criminal violence, and the use of a firearm as the murder weapon.
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Farmer. 57 The Georgia Supreme Court has since refused to release the
data on subsequently reviewed cases. 58
These data show that the Georgia Supreme Court chose cases that
are not more consistently similar to the ones under review than the other
cases in the pool. By statute, the characteristics of the crime and the
defendant should determine which cases are similar and the court
should compare the sentence imposed in the case under review with the
cases found to be similar. Instead, the court seems to have reversed the
procedure. What most distinguishes the cases chosen by the court from
those eligible 59 but not chosen is the fact that the original sentence was
death and has been upheld by the Georgia Supreme Court. In effect,
the court defines as similar those cases in which the death sentence has
been handed down and upheld, whether the characteristics of the crime
or the defendant are similar to the ones under review.
Our complex statistical analysis led us to the simple but revealing
picture of the proportionality review process given in Table 7. It shows
for each of the first thirty-six affirmed death sentences for murder how
many of the cases cited as "similar" were life cases after 1970, how many
were death cases under the pre-Furman statute, and how many were
death cases under the present post-Furman statute effective April 1973.
In all, the Georgia Supreme court cited only eighteen life cases (the
total of the second column figures), or less than ten percent, of the more
than 200 life sentences appealed to the Court between 1970 and 1977.
Moreover, seventeen of these were pre-April 1973 life cases cited in the
first six reviews, and not cited again after the thirteenth case (A. Smith).
The court cited only one life case under the new statute (as similar to
Dix). In only one case (Moore) were more life than death sentences
60
cited as similar.
The court cited twenty-two pre-Furman death cases, almost twothirds of them in the very first review. Over half of these were cited in
ten of the first fourteen reviews, and no additional pre-Furman death
cases were cited after the ninth review (Jarrell). Then, as post-Furnan
57 Willis v. State, 243 Ga. 185, 253 S.E.2d 70, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979).

58 D. Baldus, Personal communication with Curtis French, Clerk of the Georgia Supreme
Court (Sept. 28, 1983).
59 For a given proportionality review, the eligible pool is defined as all life and death cases
after 1970 that have been appealed to and reviewed by the Georgia Supreme Court on or
before the review date of the case in question.
60 Moore's case is truly extraordinary in that the trial judge imposed death-without jury
recommendations- after the defendant pleaded guilty and despite the mitigating facts that
the defendant had cooperated with the police, had no prior criminal record, was youthful,
had been intoxicated, and was first shot at by the victim. Moore v. State, 233 Ga. 861, 213
S.E.2d 829 (1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976). Federal District
Judge Edenfield later vacated the Georgia Supreme Court's proportionality review sub nom.
Blake v. Zant, 513 F. Supp. 772, 818 (S.D. Ga. 1981), at'd, 709 F.2d 1353 (1983).
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TABLE 7
CASES CITED AS SIMILAR BY THE GEORGIA SUPREME COURT IN THE
FIRST

36

PROPORTIONALITY REVIEWS OF THE DEATH SENTENCE
FOR MURDER

Defendants

Life Sentences
between 1970

Death Sentences
prior to June

Death Sentences

and 1977

1972

since April 1973

Number of
Number of
Cases Cited First Previously First Previously First Previously Citations in
as Similar Cited
Cited
Cited
Cited
Cited
Cited
Later Reviews

House

18

4

-

14

Gregg

18

-

3a

I

13a

1

Ross
Floyd

6
18

-

1

-

la
3b

4a13

1

1

3
27

McCorquodale
Moore

20
23

4
9

3
4

4

-

2a
Ia

6
13

Mitchell
Chenault
Jarrell
Berryhill

16
15
19
7

-

ia

1

-

-

-

1

1

I

2
a
3
4b

12

-

-

-

12
12
7

-

-

10

Tamplin
R. Smith
A. Smith

16
19
19

-

-

-

11

1

-

-

13
a
13

-

-

3
3a

-

4
a
3
a
3

2
12
12

Mason
Dobbs
Goodwin
Pulliam

16
15
12
15

-

-

-

12

a

I

3a

11

-

-

-

3

-

-

-

-

-

-

7
5a
7b

5
7a
8b

5
4
8

Spencer
Davis

5
15

-

-

-

a

-

-

-

l
7

I
4

Birt
Gibson
Coleman
Isaacs

14
15
19
19

-

-

-

a

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

4
10
6
7a

6
2
6
6

Street
Dungee

15
19

-

-

-

-

-

10
7

0
6

Banks

19

-

Stephens
Harris
Hill
C. Young
Dix
Pryor
Douthit
J. Young
Gaddis
Blake

19
16
26
26
17
22
19
24
24
5

-

TOTALS

-

4
5

9

11

5
12

-

-

-

-

12

-

7a

7

-

-

12

-

a

-

-

-

4
a
4

j0b
2

7
6c
b c
20 .
22a,c
¢
Il
20
12
12
a
12
4

4
3
I
2
2

a
a

-

22

-

1
-

-

6
12
a
12

18

-

3

d

I

2
-

2

-

II
5
10

27

8
5
12
a
12

-

-

30

-

5
2
1
-

1
37

1
0
0
0
-

a Includes only cases of this type cited in the preceding review.
b Includes all cases of this type cited in the preceding review.
e Includes three post-Furman death cases reversed by the Georgia Supreme Court in procedural grounds.
d Imposed under the post-Furman capital statute.
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death sentences were reviewed and affirmed, virtually all were cited by
the court in subsequent reviews. Indeed, the court had cited all but one
(Street) of the first thirty-two affirmed death cases by the thirty-sixth
review (rightmost column of Table 7). Moreover, of the first four postFurman death sentences upheld by the court, three were cited in at least
twenty-seven of the subsequent thirty-two reviews; another seven were
cited in ten or more subsequent reviews. As the notes to Table 7 indicate, there also was a tendency for the court simply to draw "similar"
cases from the group cited in the immediately preceding review.
Thus, from the substantial pool of almost 300 cases available for
proportionality review by 1977, the Georgia Supreme Court repeatedly
relied upon a small and highly selective subsample. It cited predominantly death cases, then exclusively death cases, and increasingly the
death cases it had affirmed in previous proportionality reviews; fewer
than one in ten of the available life cases and virtually nine out of ten
previously affirmed post-Furman death cases were cited in these propor61
tionality reviews.
This is not proportionality review as mandated by the Georgia capital statute and approved by the United States Supreme Court in Gregg,
but a process of legally rationalizing trial court decisions to impose
death as punishment, regardless of proportionality or excessiveness relative to the sentences in similar cases. Thus, arbitrariness is evident in the
decisions and actions of state appellate court judges, as well as those of
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and juries; automatic appellate review,
like sentencing guidelines and separate penalty hearings, also has failed
to serve its intended purpose.
VI.

FEDERAL APPELLATE REVIEW

The burden of detecting and correcting arbitrariness and discrimi61 Ofcourse, these same data could be used by the Georgia Supreme Court to see whether
there are systematic statewide disparities of treatment among cases similar in legally relevant
ways. For example, the data show substantial differences in likelihood of a death sentence by
race of offender and victim and by geographical location within the state among cases comparable both in felony circumstance and prior criminal record, the principal legally aggravating
factors alleged to account for racial differences. See Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal
Sentencing: A CriticalEvaluationof the Evidence with AdditionalEvidence on the DeathPenaly 416 AM.
Soc. REV. 783 (1981). Further, these data reveal that 72% of the convicted offenders who
were transients in the community where the crime occurred-as compared with 25% of those
who were residents--received a death sentence. Although the number of transient offenders
is relatively small for statistical comparisons, this difference is not attributable to differences
in the felony circumstances of the crime or the prior record of the defendants. With these
continually accumulating data on hand and these leads to pursue, the Georgia Supreme
Court might be expected to investigate disparities of treatment associated with place, race,
residency, and so forth, and make available the accumulating data for what they may reveal
about the constitutionality of the death penalty as applied and reviewed for proportionality.
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nation in capital sentencing and at earlier stages of the process has fallen
by necessity upon the federal appellate courts. Challenges to the death
penalty as applied came first to the federal district courts in southern
states where death sentences were most commonly imposed. These
courts, in turn, looked to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
(whose decisions then governed the actions of trial and appellate courts
in Florida, Georgia, and Texas, as well as most other southern states) for
standards to apply in judging death penalty appeals. Such standards
were established in the case of John Spinkelink.
In its September, 1977 representation of John Spinkelink, the Legal
Defense Fund presented evidence of racial bias-specifically, the disproportionate use of the death sentence in white victim cases-in the administration of Florida's capital statute. 6 2 At that time there were 114
men on death row, of whom ninety-four percent had killed only whites,
two percent had killed both whites and blacks, and four percent had
63
killed only blacks-in a state where most homicide victims are black.
Eighty-five of 114 had committed their murders in the course of another
felony, typically robbery.64 Of these, eighty-three were white victim
cases; one was a mixed race and one a black victim case. Compared to
their incidence in the population, white victim felony-related killings
were thirty-one times more likely to be punished by death than black
victim felony killings. 65 These statistics were presented by expert witnesses for Spinkelink at an evidentiary hearing in the Tallahassee federal district court with the following statement: "The statistics provide
primafacie evidence of bias, strong enough to suggest that the burden of
proving that no such bias exists should shift to the prosecutor. He
should be required to show that the statistical discrepancy is the result of
'66
some factor other than bias."
The district court denied Spinkelink's petition, 67 and this ruling
was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. A threejudge panel of the Fifth Circuit then ruled that these statistical data
were irrelevant and that the defendant must show "racially discriminatory intent or purpose" in terms of specific actions taken against him in
his case, in order to demonstrate a violation of constitutional protection.68 The court held that the Florida statute itself was immune from
constitutional challenges of arbitrariness and that such a statistical anal62 Unpublished data collected by W. Sheppard & H. Carithers, Jacksonville, Florida
(1972-1981) (On file in the Harvard Law School Library).
63 Zeisel, supra note 9, at 458.
64 Id. at 459.
65 Id. at 460.
66 Id at 461, (reprinting the report of the expert witness).
67 Spinkelink v. Wainwright, No. 77-0895, slip op. (N.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 1977).
68 Spinkelink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 615, 616 (5th Cir. 1978).
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ysis was, therefore, unwarranted and beyond the court's review obligations. Relying upon language in Proftitt v. Florida,69 the court
determined that the Florida statute was not subject to challenge as applied except in those cases where petitioners could show specific acts of
intentional discrimination against them because of their or their victims'
race.

70

In effect, by closing the door on statistical evidence and restricting
the scope of federal appellate review, the Spinklink decision erected a
judicial shield against challenges of arbitrariness and discrimination in
the states of the Fifth Circuit, where the death penalty is now and has
been most widely used. In other words, Spftzkelink provided the protection behind which the new statutes approved in Gregg might operate
relatively free of monitoring by the federal courts for the kinds of consti7
tutional violations that invalidated the former statutes. '
In June 1979, shortly after Spinkelink's execution, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund challenged Georgia's capital statute in the Atlanta
federal district court at combined evidentiary hearings in the cases of
House v. Balkcom 72 and McCorquodalev. Balkcom 73 by presenting statistical
evidence on the application of Georgia's capital statute. In House and
69 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
70 The Fifth Circuit's response to the statistical evidence of racial bias in Spinkelink v.
Wainwright closely resembles the Eighth Circuit's reaction to similar evidence ten years earlier in Maxwell v. Bishop, 39 F.2d 138 (1968), vacated, 398 U.S. 262 (1970). Both courts held
that the statistical evidence of vast racial disparities in the likelihood of a death sentence was,
nevertheless, inadequate because some legally relevant but omitted factors conceivably could
have accounted for the racial disparities. The courts further found the statistical evidence
irrelevant because the data were not specific to the handling of the case under review. Although in Maxwell the data on rape cases came from 19 representative counties in Arkansas,
the county in which Maxwell was tried was not included.
Ironically, eight years after the Maxwell court ruled that this evidence was inadequate
and irrelevant, the Solicitor General of the United States conceded, in his amicus brief supporting capital punishment in Gregg and companion cases, that the statistical evidence
presented in Maxwell clearly justified conclusions of racial discrimination: "[W]e do not question [the Arkansas study's] conclusion that during the twenty years in question, in southern
states, there was discrimination in rape cases." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae,
app. A at 5a, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), reprintedin Zeisel, supra note 9, at 458.
71 The Fifth Circuit's commitment to this Spinkelink shield was underscored a year later.
In August 1979, a panel of the Fifth Circuit held in Jurek v. Estelle, 593 F.2d 672 (5th Cir.
1979) (jurek I), that statistical patterns of racial disparities could suffice asprimafacie evidence
of "intent to discriminate," citing the legal principle that actors are responsible for the natural and foreseeable consequences of their actions. Within weeks, Jurek was withdrawn for
rehearing en banc. Within three months, a replacement version ofJurek v. Estelle, 593 F.2d
672 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 623 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1001 (1981), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1014 (1981) (jurekIl), appeared with no reference
to the role of statistical evidence in demonstrating intent to discriminate, thus leaving intact
the judicial shield established by Spinkelink.
72 C78-471A, slip op. (1979), petitionfor habeasrelieffiom death sentence granted, 562 F.Supp.
1111 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
73 525 F.Supp. 431 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
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McCorquodale, data revealed both disparities by race like those presented
in Spinkelink and disparities by region within the state. As in Florida,
the data documented disproportionate imposition of the death sentence
especially for white victim killings, and the bias was present for both
felony and nonfelony homicides. The data further revealed disparities
of treatment for judicial circuits grouped regionally, for felony- or
nonfelony-type killings, and for white victim or black victim felony-type
murders.

74

To challenge this evidence, the state engaged Timothy S. Carr, Director of Research for the Georgia Department of Corrections, as an
expert, but did not call him to the witness stand. In a letter to the presiding federal magistrate, Mr. Carr offered his professional evaluation,
saying that the magnitude of the racial disparities "is as great as anything I have ever seen in my seven years of processing and interpreting
criminal justice data in Georgia," and that he "did not believe that a
difference of this magnitude would 'wash out' statistically even if all the
' ' 75
[legally relevant] factors . . . were to work in concert to nullify it.
The federal magistrate's order in Hose and McCorquodale disallowed further consideration of this statistical evidence of racial and regional disparities, explicitly indicating that such evidence did not meet
the standard established in Spinkelink.76 This evidence eventually
reached the Fifth Circuit in the case of Smith v. Balkcom (Smith I),77 at
which point the circuit court rejected it, citing Spinkelink.
Then came the first scoring of the Spinkelink shield. The Fifth Circuit withdrew its Smith opinion for rehearing and issued a modified
opinion in Smith v. Balkcom (Smith I1),78 which explicitly recognized that
statistical evidence could serve as proof of "intent to discriminate"
under a fourteenth amendment equal protection challenge. The court,
however, rejected the particular statistical evidence presented in Smith I,
saying that it "falls short. . . of establishing an equal protection violation." 79 This turnaround came just as the Fifth Circuit was split into
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. Because the case was argued before the
bifurcation, however, Smith II was binding on the courts of both circuits.
The new Eleventh Circuit court recently took a further step in Prof
ftt v. Wainwright.80 Citing the United States Supreme Court's decision
74 See W. Bowers, supra note 3, at Chapter Seven.
75 Smith v. Balkcom,petitionfor cert. 24-25 (U.S. June 22, 1982)(No. 81-6978).
76 See McCorquodale v. Balkcom, 525 F. Supp. 431, 432 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
77 660 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981).
78 677 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1982).
79 This represented a return to the position purged from Jurek I byJurek I-a
slight but
definite weakening of the Spinkelink shield. See supra note 71.
80 685 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir. 1982).
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in Godfrey v. Georgia8 ' as precedent, the Eleventh Circuit held that both
sentencing and review decisions of state trial and appellate courts were
open to eighth amendment challenges in the application of statutory
and nonstatutory sentencing criteria. The Proffitt court held that "in
view of Godfrey, we can only conclude that the language in the Spinke/ink
opinion precluding federal courts from reviewing state court's applica82
tion of capital sentencing criteria is no longer sound precedent.1
In effect, the protection afforded post-Furman capital statutes by
Spinkehnk-which itself arbitrarily impeded constitutional challenges to
the application of these statutes-was weakened by Smith II in the geographically restricted jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit, and by Smith II
and Proffitt in the jurisdiction of the newly formed Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit. The actions taken in Smith If and Proffitt mean
that federal courts in these two circuits now have a freer hand in monitoring the application of existing capital statutes, and that statisticallybased challenges to the death penalty as applied will soon be brought to
the United States Supreme Court on appeal. That is to say, the
Supreme Court will soon be faced again with the question it sidestepped
in declining to hear Spinkelink v. Wainwrzght, this time with considerably
stronger evidence of arbitrariness and discrimination.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The evidence of arbitrariness and discrimination presented here is
qualitatively more than a statistical demonstration that sentencing practices of certain states have failed to meet the Furman standard. Beyond
this, we have seen that the arbitrariness is manifold in its links to race,
location within a state, and other personal, situational, and social influences; pervasive in its presence at various decision points in the handling
of capital cases; intractable under different kinds of statutes in different
states; and replicated in different kinds of studies using different kinds of
data. These findings represent an extension of our perspective on arbitrariness in capital punishment in that they explicate some of the ways
in which extralegal influences operate even in the presence of postFurman statutory reforms--how prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
judges, as well as jurors, become the agents of both systematic and unsystematic arbitrariness.
The evidence further confirms the view that arbitrariness is inherent in the use of capital punishment. 83 Where death is available as pun81 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
82 685 F.2d at 1262 n.52.
83 For a further expansion of this theory, see W. Bowers, supra note 3, at Chapters Five &
Seven.
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ishment, according to this theory, it will be used in ways that reflect
dominant community sentiments and that override standards of evenhanded justice, whatever form the capital statutes may take. To be
sure, statutory reforms possibly may affect how and where arbitrariness
occurs in the handling of cases, but changes are apt to be more apparent
than real. Thus, the vast difference in the use of the death penalty by
location within states observed since Furman appears to have been a pattern consistent with the pre-Funnan era. Further, differential treatment
by race of victim, so apparent in the post-Furman era, also has dominated as a source of bias historically. A great many other extralegal
factors such as wealth, property ownership, resident/transient status in
the community, and unpopular political or religious beliefs may also
affect the handling of cases, but have not been examined thus far for
lack of systematic data. The consistent cumulative effect of attorney
type adds a further element of arbitrariness and may reflect the influence of factors yet to be examined.
Above all, the evidence presented here should dispel the notion that
the problem of arbitrariness is confined to sentencing. Its presence is
clear in the sentencing process-disparities by race and location persist
under strong statistical controls for legally relevant considerations-but
such arbitrariness also appears at every other stage of the process that
we have been able to examine. Greater guidance in sentencing and
stricter separation between the guilt and punishment decisions have
failed not only as a solution to the problem of arbitrary sentencing of
convicted offenders, but also, contrary to Justice White's hopes, as a statutory guide to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The data show
that neither prosecutorial decisions made before or after trial nor the
judgment of guilt itself is free from recurrent biases. Furthermore, over
successive stages of the process these biases-especially the racial biasare cumulative in nature.
So far, the federal courts, especially the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, have taken the narrow view that arbitrariness must be
demonstrated strictly and specifically in sentencing, and that statistical
evidence is irrelevant, as in Spinkelink, or insufficient, as in Smith II, because it does not strictly focus upon sentencing or control for conceivaYet, the Furman Justices objected to the
bly confounding factors.
freakish, rare, arbitrary use of the death penalty in which one defendant
and not another was condemned to death with no meaningful distinction between their cases, whether this was the product of sentencing or
decisions elsewhere in the process. That statutory sentencing guidelines
would seem, according to the Gregg Court, to remedy the problem, does
not mean that the Court found arbitrariness constitutionally acceptable
if it occurred elsewhere. Why else would Justice White address himself
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to the presumed derivative benefits of sentencing guidelines on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion? It is cynical to suppose that the Supreme
Court is concerned only with the arbitrariness and biases ofjurors, while
granting to the regular participants in the criminal justice process the
privilege of caprice and systematic bias at the expense of the capital
defendant whose cost may be his life. The language of Chief Justice
Burger in Furman was "evenhanded justice," not "evenhanded
sentencing."

